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Abstract
Climate change litigation, which is often perceived as an attempt to fill the regulatory gap
left  by  the  traditional  decision-making  legislative  and  executive  branches,  has  grown
intensively in recent years, becoming an important feature of climate governance in the US
and a growing trend in some other jurisdictions. However, climate cases often involve a
range  of  complex  legal  and non-legal  issues,  such as  separation  of  powers,  scientific
uncertainty, causation and liability. How effective is the judiciary in climate policy-making
and what impact will it have on global climate governance? The paper attempts to answer
this question by discussing the role of the judiciary in contemporary climate governance
and the specifics of regulatory approaches adopted by courts in dealing with climate cases.
1. Introduction
Climate change is commonly considered a global problem, which taken at its worst, could
significantly  and  irreversibly  change  the  life  on  the  planet,  bringing  down  many
ecosystems and human communities alike.1 As the awareness of the human impact on the
climate grew over the last few decades, the international community agreed to tackle this
problem by gradually curbing the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.2 However, it
soon  proved  to  be  a  much  more  difficult  task  than  anticipated,  as  the  global  climate
governance  was  undermined  by squabbling  over  the  reduction  commitments  and  their
implementation, fueled by immediate economic trade-offs.3
* PhD researcher, Mykolas Romeris University. Email: sam.vasti@gmail.com 
1 See, in general, IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I,
II  and  III  to  the  Fifth  Assessment  Report  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  [Core
Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp. 
2 See  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York, 9 May 1992; in force 21
March 1994.
3 Lazarus, Richard J. "Super wicked problems and climate change: Restraining the present to liberate the
future" Cornell Law Review 94 (2009): 1153-1233.
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Despite the fact that there may be certain difficulties in defining climate change litigation,4
the latter is widely considered to be an attempt to fill the regulatory gap  in the existing
climate  regime.5 The  first  cases  explicitly concerning the emissions  of  GHG and their
impact on climate date back to the early 1990s; however, it took more than a decade for
climate  lawsuits  to  experience  a  dramatic  increase  in  popularity,  coinciding  with  the
history-making  2007  decision  of  the  US  Supreme  Court  in  case  Massachusetts  v.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).6 And although the US remains the main arena for
climate  change  litigation,  similar  cases  have  already  made  their  way  into  other
jurisdictions, most notably pertaining to the common law legal system.7
2. Climate Change Litigation: A Growing Trend
Over  the  years,  the  body of  climate  change  litigation  has  been  subject  to  significant
transformation and evolution – not only in terms of size, as the number of lawsuits has
grown exponentially – but with regard to regulatory pathways that the litigants pursued. So
far,  the  existing  legal  scholarship  has  distinguished several  climate  change  lawsuits'
typologies based on the type of action, focus of the claim, regulatory effect, etc.8 Some
types  of  lawsuits  –  for  example,  challenges  to  agency permits  and rules –  have  been
traditionally  used  to  a  much  broader  extent  and  with  more  success  than  others  –  for
example,  common  law  claims  based  on  public  nuisance  or  public  trust  doctrine.9
Furthermore, certain types of lawsuits, including the above-mentioned claims under public
trust  doctrine,  are  only  making  their  way  onto  the  judicial stage.10 In  addition,  the
difference between legal as well as political systems dictates the specifics of lawsuits and
their potential for impacting the existing national policy.11
Whatever the typologies of climate change litigation may be and however such cases may
affect  different  jurisdictions,  the  fact  remains  that  courts  are  bound to  face  a  growing
number of lawsuits, as the consequences of climate change become more palpable and the
4 See, for example, Markell, David, and J. B. Ruhl. "An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the
Courts:  A New  Jurisprudence  or  Business  as  Usual?"  Florida  Law Review 64  (2012):  15-86;  Peel,
Jacqueline,  and Hari  M. Osofsky.  "Climate Change Litigation's Regulatory Pathways:  A Comparative
Analysis of the United States and Australia" Law & Policy 35.3 (2013): 150-183.
5 Preston, Brian J. "Climate Change Litigation (Part 1)" Carbon & Climate Law Review (2011): 3-14; Lin,
Jolene.  "Climate change and the courts"  Legal Studies 32.1 (2012):  35-57; Gerrard,  Michael  B.,  and
Joseph A.  MacDougald.  "An Introduction to  Climate  Change  Liability Litigation  and  a  View to  the
Future"  Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 20 (2013): 153-164.  Peel and Osofsky, supra note 4; van
Asselt, Harro, Michael Mehling, and Clarisse Kehler Siebert. "The changing architecture of international
climate  change  law"  in Research  handbook  on  climate  change  mitigation  law,  edited  by Geert  Van
Calster, Wim Vandenberghe and Leonie Reins. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing (2015): 1-30.
6 Peel,  Jacqueline,  and Hari  M. Osofsky.  Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner
Energy. Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 19; Wilensky, Meredith. "Climate Change in the Courts: An
Assessment of Non-US Climate Litigation" Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 26 (2015): 131-
179.
7 See Wilensky, supra note 6.
8 See supra notes 4-6.
9 Markell and Ruhl, supra note 4.
10 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 4.
11 Ibid.
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awareness of climate change-induced risks increases. Accordingly, certain types of lawsuits
– for example on adaptation – will most likely become more common12 and take their place
alongside the established categories of cases. Furthermore, with the persisting practice of
states' “lagging” in mitigation efforts, a number of climate lawsuits are likely to directly
target state policy with regard to GHG emissions reduction and invoke state liability in the
absence of concrete steps to adhere to the reduction commitments. Some of these cases
have already made their  way into  courtrooms in  the  US and beyond;13 however,  both
procedural and substantive hurdles loom over them, as many relevant issues, including the
causation and justiciability, may come under fierce debate when dealing with such cases.14
3. Climate Governance: The Role of the Judiciary 
Like  other  spheres  of  public  governance,  the  governance  of  climate  change  has  been
traditionally within the realm of legislative and executive branches.  The global climate
governance, including UNFCCC and the subsequent action under its platform, is the result
of  intergovernmental  cooperation;  similarly,  national  climate  policies  are  the  result  of
political  dialogue  within  the  national  jurisdiction  of  single  states.  Understandably,  the
global climate governance was, and remains, strongly influenced by national policies of
different states15 – particularly major contributors of global GHG emissions like the US,
China, India, etc. – usually driven not by scientific, but political approach to the issue of
climate change.16   
As  the  power  of  the  judiciary  is  commonly  limited  to  judicial  review  under  existing
legislation, the role of courts in national climate governance is naturally restricted, and the
dominating types of lawsuits usually revolve around the interpretation and compliance with
the existing statutes on air quality and environmental impact assessment.17 This type of
litigation has indeed a rich history. For example, in the US it includes a wide range of
cases, brought under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the National Environmental Policy Act
12 See Peel, Jacqueline, and Hari M. Osofsky. "Sue To Adapt?" Minnesota Law Review 99.6 (2015): 2177-
2250.
13 See, for example, Friends of the Earth v. Canada, FC 1183 (2008) (Federal Court, Canada); Kanuk v.
Alaska,  S-141776 (2014) (Supreme  Court  of  Alaska,  US); Urgenda  Foundation  v.  The  State  of  the
Netherlands, C/09/456689 / HA ZA 13-1396 (2015) (Hague District Court, the Netherlands) (available in
English  at  http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf);
Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan,  W.P. No. 25501/2015 (2015) (Lahore High Court, Pakistan);
Juliana v. United States, 6:15-cv-01517 (2016) (District Court for the District of Oregon, US).
14 See Bergkamp, Lucas, and Jaap C. Hanekamp. "Climate Change Litigation against States: The Perils of
Court-made Climate Policies" European Energy and Environmental Law Review 24.5 (2015): 102-114.
15 Moncel, Remi, and Harro van Asselt. "All hands on deck! Mobilizing climate change action beyond the
UNFCCC" Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 21.3 (2012): 163-176.
16 See, for example: Peel, Jacqueline, Lee Godden, and Rodney J. Keenan. "Climate change law in an era of
multi-level  governance"  Transnational  Environmental  Law 1.2  (2012):  245-280;  Belis,  David,  et  al.
"China,  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union:  Multiple  Bilateralism  and  Prospects  for  a  New
Climate Change Diplomacy" Carbon & Climate Law Review 9.3 (2015): 203-218; Wirth, David A. "The
International  and Domestic  Law of Climate Change:  A Binding International  Agreement Without the
Senate or Congress?" Harvard Environmental Law Review 39.2 (2015): 515-566.
17 Markell and Ruhl, supra note 4.
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(NEPA).18 Apart from cases heard before lower courts, the former came into focus in all
three climate cases to reach the US Supreme Court –  Massachusetts v. EPA,19 where the
litigants managed to persuade the Court that the CAA authorized EPA to regulate tailpipe
GHG  emissions  from new  motor  vehicles, American  Electric  Power v.  Connecticut,20
establishing that the CAA and EPA's action under it displaced federal common law public
nuisance claims and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,21 holding that the same CAA did
not authorize EPA to require specific permitting for stationary sources based on their GHG
emissions. For  its  part,  NEPA was  the  platform under  which  the  first  climate  change
lawsuits were brought in the US in the early 1990s and many subsequent lawsuits in the
years  following.22 Similarly,  litigation  under  national  environmental  impact  assessment
legislation has been much prolific outside the US,  particularly in those jurisdictions with
established climate change litigation traditions.23 
In  general,  however,  the  above-mentioned litigation  –  both US and non-US – did  not
require  the  courts  to  rule  on  the  policy itself,  but  rather  on  the  related  administrative
procedures and competences.24 In other words, for the most part climate change litigation
focused on “courts deciding whether and how administrative agencies must take climate
change  into  account  in  decision-making  under  existing  statutes.”25 Even  so,  the
justiciability of such lawsuits, never mind claims directly aiming at national climate change
mitigation efforts or climate-affected human rights,26 has been a subject of debate within
the  courts  themselves.  Thus,  in  the  US it  has  been  a  common practice  to  invoke  the
principle  of separation of powers,27 by stating,  for example,  that  climate-related policy
should be dealt with by the legislature and executive,  which  are far better  equipped to
handle it.28 Nonetheless, as it may be observed from both the US and non-US litigation, the
separation of powers issue does not present an insuperable challenge; moreover, courts in
some jurisdictions, for example Australia, are much more lenient with regard to it, which
substantially facilitate the hearing of cases on their merits.29
Overall, it has to be acknowledged that the role of the judiciary in the shaping of climate
governance is still in the process of development. Though it is true that courts face and will
continue to face a growing number of climate cases, so far there have only been a few of
them, which could be accounted as  successful,  while  the vast  majority of  lawsuits  are
18 Ibid.
19 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
20 American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
21 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
22 Markell and Ruhl, supra note 4.
23 Wilensky, supra note 6.
24 See, for example, Markell and Ruhl, supra note 4;  Bogojević, Sanja. "EU Climate Change Litigation, the
Role of the European Courts, and the Importance of Legal Culture" Law & Policy 35.3 (2013): 184-207;
Wilensky, supra note 6.
25 Markell and Ruhl, supra note 4.
26 Supra note 13.
27 The separation of powers emerged in all three Supreme Court cases mentioned above and in many other
climate cases before lower courts, for example Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, C
08-1138 SBA (2009) (District Court for the Nothern District of California); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,
12-60291 (2013) (United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit), etc. 
28 AEP v. Connecticut.
29 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 6, 270-278.
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dismissed on procedural or substantive grounds. At the same time, it is also true that even
in case of success, the litigation may not necessarily have an actual impact on the policy,
particularly if a successful case is just an isolated episode.30 On the other hand, a successful
case in a highly litigious environment, such as Massachusetts v. EPA in the US, has a much
higher potential to become a factor shaping the national climate policy in the respective
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the very fact that courts have been willing to accept the science
of  climate  change  and  stress  its  importance  in  considering  the  routine  activities  and
projects of governing bodies and companies, shows a growing potential of such cases.31    
The  question  therefore  remains  whether  successful  court  decisions  could  affect  global
climate governance as well.  In a sense,  any climate change case has some potential  to
affect  global climate itself, since the latter is driven by GHG emissions universally, thus
any action/inaction with regard to the levels of emissions in one state actually impacts the
global  situation.32 This,  however,  does  not  necessarily presume that  global  governance
would  be affected by the  decisions  of  national  courts.  Nevertheless,  a  successful  legal
precedent in one jurisdiction might become an impetus for climate action – and ultimately,
litigation – elsewhere,  which could then lead to  a  certain trend,  influencing the global
dialogue on climate.33 Furthermore, some legal scholars have been keen on emphasizing
the indirect effect the judiciary has on climate policy as a whole – by drawing additional
public and governmental attention to the problem of climate change and facilitating public
participation  in  climate  governance  not  only in  their  respective  states,  but  also  at  the
international level.34                   
   
4. Liability for Climate Change
The science-related problem of whether any entity could be held liable for climate change
has been a vital issue in many climate cases. One of the main reasons for that, is that it has
often affected standing, which has traditionally been one of the major obstacles in the way
of claimants.35 Thus, for example, in the US climate change litigation the federal courts
assess  standing  in  accordance  with  Article  III  of  the  US  Constitution  by  requiring  a
30 Wilensky, supra note 6. See, for example, Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum (2005) (Federal Court of Nigeria).
31 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 6, 286-287; Wilensky, supra note 6. For litigation see for example, Gray v.
Minister for Planning,  152 LGERA 258 (2006) (Land and Environment Court  of New South Wales,
Australia); Massachusetts  v.  Environmental  Protection  Agency; Utility  Air  Regulatory  Group  v.
Environmental Protection Agency.
32 This  position  is  in  fact  highlighted  by courts  themselves  – see,  for  example,  Massachusetts  v.  EPA,
Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands. 
33 See, for example, van Zeben, Josephine. "Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change
Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?" Transnational Environmental Law 4.2 (2015): 339-357; Cox,
Roger.  "A climate  change  litigation  precedent:  Urgenda Foundation v The State  of  the  Netherlands"
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 34.2 (2016): 1-20. 
34 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 4, Lin,  supra note 5. Thus, for example, the very few attempts to bring
forward any climate-related concerns into the international  forums – for example the  Inuit  petition to
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights – so far have sought merely an attraction of international
attention to the problems posed by climate change, rather than actual problem-solving.
35 The constrains related to standing, however, may also be attributable to the separation of powers. See Peel
and Osofsky, supra note 6, 270-271.
5
Berlin Conference “Transformative Global Climate Governance après Paris” (May 2016) // Samvel Varvaštian 
plaintiff to show “(1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”36 It is true that courts accept the fact that states enjoy
relaxed standing, as in  Massachusetts v. EPA,  where their sovereign regulatory interests
were injured due to the lack of  regulatory power; the situation though is different for
private claimants, including NGOs, suing the industry, or states and federal government.37
Since the US Supreme Court  has  been reluctant  to  resolve the issue of  private  person
standing in climate cases, lower courts have often been split over it.38 
As a result, in order to have standing, the private claimants in US climate cases first of all
have to undergo the pains of proving that they have suffered personal injury from industry
or state action/inaction with regard to greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting climate
change.39 However, in a number of cases the plaintiffs have been denied standing, because
the courts considered the alleged harm to their interests was too generalized or even not
identifiable at all to establish standing.40 Such difficulties have been most obvious in cases,
where claimants  referred  to  complex  and  widespread  injuries,  allegedly  attributed  to
climate change.41 In contrast, courts – whether federal or state – have been more willing to
accept that the claimants suffered an injury when the claim specified the personal harm
brought by climate change to a concrete claimant.42 In some of these cases, for example,
the  courts  held  that  denying standing would  actually bar judicial  redress  for  the  most
widespread and dangerous injuries,  solely because they might affect a large number of
people.43 
Another related and particularly notorious universal challenge to liability and, accordingly,
plaintiffs' standing, is the necessity to prove that a concrete injury has actually been caused
by  industry's or state's action/inaction with regard to greenhouse gas emissions and the
36 The  three-element "irreducible  constitutional  minimum of  standing",  established  by the  US Supreme
Court in case  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  See, for example,  Native Village of
Kivalina  v.  ExxonMobil  Corporation,  Amigos  Bravos  v.  U.S.  Bureau of  Land Management,  6:09-cv-
00037-RB-LFG (2011) (United  States  District  Court  for  the  District  of  New  Mexico); Washington
Environmental  Council  v.  Bellon,  12-35323  (2013)  (United  States  Court  Of  Appeals  for  the  Ninth
Circuit); Communities  for a Better  Environment v.  Environmental  Protection Agency,  11-1423 (2014)
(United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit).
37 Bradford,  Gregory.  "Simplifying  State  Standing:  The  Role  of  Sovereign  Interests  in  Future  Climate
Litigation" Boston College Law Review 52 (2011): 1065-1103.
38 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 6, 77.
39 See,  for  example,  Amigos  Bravos  v.  U.S.  Bureau of  Land Management; Californians  for  Renewable
Energy v. Department of Energy, 11-2128(JEB) (2012) (United States District Court for the District of
Columbia); WildEarth  Guardians v.  Jewell,  12-5300 (2013) (United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the
District of Columbia Circuit); Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon.
40 See,  for  example,  Californians  for  Renewable  Energy  v.  Department of  Energy;  Conservation  Law
Foundation  v.  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  10-11455-MLW (2013)  (United  States  District
Court for the District of Massachusetts).
41 Bradford, supra note 37. See, for example,  Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management.
42 See, for example,  WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell;  Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon; High
Country Conservation Advocates v. United States Forest Service, 13-cv-01723-RBJ (2014) (United States
District Court for the District of Colorado);  WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management,  1:11-
cv-01481-RJL (2014)  (United  States  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Columbia);  Kanuk  v.  Alaska;
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 13-cv-01060 (2015)
(United States District Court for the District of Utah); Juliana v. United States.
43 Kanuk v. Alaska; Juliana v. United States.
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resulting climate change.44 In practical terms, this signifies that plaintiffs must effectively
rely on scientific evidence; however, as there is still a degree of uncertainty in the science
of climate change, a tangible causal chain between the defendant's action/inaction, global
problem of climate change as it is and the concrete harm to the plaintiff may be quite
obscure.45 
Besides, despite the seemingly universal consensus that human activity is impacting the
climate, it has been a common practice to deny any individual responsibility for it. Thus,
industries and in some cases, states or agencies, claimed that their contribution was too
negligible to affect the climate or, alternatively, that it  was but a fraction of the global
problem, hence it would be unjustified to impose on them liability for climate change,
majorly caused by the GHG emissions of others.46 In some cases the courts have been
persuaded by such an argument;47 in others, however, it has been ruled that the fact that
many parties contribute to climate change should not presume the absence of individual
contribution,  hence,  responsibility,  since  the  global  situation  is  affected  by  each  and
everyone's action/inaction with regard to this common problem.48 
In conclusion, as may be perceived, although the above-mentioned hurdles have not been
specific to US climate change litigation only and plaintiffs in other jurisdictions are often
challenged in likewise manner, some courts have already ruled positive on the issue of
climate responsibility, including such obligations imposed on a national government.49 This
means that proving causation should not be deemed impossible in any future litigation as
well. 
5. Concluding Remarks
Some concerns are expressed that the developing climate change litigation trend may not
be  an  overall  positive  to  the  way  climate  governance  functions  and  may  even  cause
backlash.50 Indeed the industry has already fired back with anti-regulatory lawsuits51 in
response to the pro-regulatory claims, brought by private persons, environmental groups
and in some cases even public authorities. At the same time, it must be made clear that the
obstinate denial of responsibility and clinging to the short-term economic benefit by states
and the industry will only continue to fuel litigious activism, particularly in the light of a
44 Faure,  Michael  G.,  and  Andre  Nollkaemper.  "International  liability  as  an  instrument  to  prevent  and
compensate for climate change" Stanford Environmental Law Journal 26.1 (2007): 123-179.
45 See Native  Village  of  Kivalina;  Amigos  Bravos  v.  U.S.  Bureau  of  Land  Management; Washington
Environmental Council v.  Bellon;  Communities for a Better Environment v.  Environmental  Protection
Agency.
46 See, for example, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency; Urgenda Foundation v. The State
of the Netherlands.
47 See, for example, Amigos Bravos v.  U.S. Bureau of  Land Management;  Hapner v. Tidwell,  09-35896
(2010) (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
48 Massachusetts v. EPA;  Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands.
49 Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands.
50 Bergkamp and Hanekamp, supra note 14. 
51 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 6, 283-308.
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few successful precedents in various jurisdictions. With that in mind, the role of courts in
climate governance could be considered  vital as  the judiciary may be by far  the most
authoritative instance for public participation when the legislature and executive fail  to
secure the adequate policy.      
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